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Abstract. When dealing with process calculi and automata which ex-
press both nondeterministic and probabilistic behavior, it is customary
to introduce the notion of scheduler to resolve the nondeterminism. It
has been observed that for certain applications, notably those in secu-
rity, the scheduler needs to be restricted so not to reveal the outcome
of the protocol’s random choices, or otherwise the model of adversary
would be too strong even for “obviously correct” protocols. We propose
a process-algebraic framework in which the control on the scheduler can
be specified in syntactic terms, and we show how to apply it to solve the
problem mentioned above. We also consider the definition of (probabilis-
tic) may and must preorders, and we show that they are precongruences
with respect to the restricted schedulers. Furthermore, we show that all
the operators of the language, except replication, distribute over proba-
bilistic summation, which is a useful property for verification.
1 Introduction
Security protocols, in particular those for anonymity and fair exchange, often
use randomization to achieve their targets. Since they usually involve more than
one agent, they also give rise to concurrent and interactive activities that can be
best modeled by nondeterminism. Thus it is convenient to specify them using
a formalism which is able to represent both probabilistic and nondeterministic
behavior. Formalisms of this kind have been explored in both Automata Theory
[1–5] and in Process Algebra [6–11]. See also [12, 13] for comparative and more
inclusive overviews.
Due to the presence of nondeterminism, in such formalisms it is not possible
to define the probability of events in absolute terms. We need first to decide
how each nondeterministic choice during the execution will be resolved. This
decision function is called scheduler. Once the scheduler is fixed, the behavior of
the system (relatively to the given scheduler) becomes fully probabilistic and a
probability measure can be defined following standard techniques.
It has been observed by several researchers that in security the notion of
scheduler needs to be restricted, or otherwise any secret choice of the protocol
could be revealed by making the choice of the scheduler depend on it. This issue
⋆ This work has been partially supported by the INRIA DREI Équipe Associée
PRINTEMPS and by the INRIA ARC project ProNoBiS.
was for instance one of the main topics of discussion at the panel of CSFW 2006.
We illustrate it here with an example on anonymity. We use the standard CCS
notation, plus a construct of probabilistic choice P +p Q representing a process
that evolves into P with probability p and into Q with probability 1 − p.
The following system Sys consists of one receiver R and two senders S, T
which communicate via private channels a, b respectively. Which of the two
senders is successful is decided probabilistically by R. After reception, R sends
a signal ok.
R
∆
= a.ok .0 +0.5 b.ok .0 S
∆
= ā.0 T
∆
= b̄.0 Sys
∆
= (νa)(νb)(R | S | T )
The signal ok is not private, but since it is the same in both cases, in principle
an external observer should not be able to infer from it the identity of the sender
(S or T ). So the system should be anonymous. However, consider a team of two
attackers A and B defined as
A
∆
= ok .s̄.0 B
∆
= ok .t̄.0
and consider the parallel composition Sys | A | B . We have that, under certain
schedulers, the system is no longer anonymous. More precisely, a scheduler could
leak the identity of the sender via the channels s, t by forcing R to synchronize
with A on ok if R has chosen the first alternative, and with B otherwise. This
is because in general a scheduler can see the whole history of the computation,
in particular the random choices, even those which are supposed to be private.
Note that the visibility of the synchronization channels to the scheduler is not
crucial for this example: we would have the same problem, for instance, if S, T
were both defined as ā.0, R as a.ok .0, and Sys as (νa)((S +0.5 T ) | R).
The above example demonstrates that, with the standard definition of sched-
uler, it is not possible to represent a truly private random choice (or a truly
private nondeterministic choice, for the matter) with the current probabilistic
process calculi. This is a clear shortcoming when we want to use these formalisms
for the specification and verification of security protocols.
There is another issue related to verification: a private choice has certain
algebraic properties that would be useful in proving equivalences between pro-
cesses. In fact, if the outcome of a choice remains private, then it should not
matter at which point of the execution the process makes such choice, until it
actually uses it. Consider for instance A and B defined as follows
A
∆
= a(x).([x = 0]ok
+0.5
[x = 1]ok)
B
∆
=a(x).[x = 0]ok
+0.5
a(x).[x = 1]ok
Process A receives a value and then decides randomly whether it will accept the
value 0 or 1. Process B does exactly the same thing except that the choice is
performed before the reception of the value. If the random choices in A and B are
private, intuitively we should have that A and B are equivalent (A ≈ B). This is
because it should not matter whether the choice is done before or after receiving
2
A | ā0 | ā1
([0 = 0]ok +0.5 [0 = 1]ok) | ā1 ok0
([1 = 0]ok +0.5 [1 = 1]ok) | ā0
0
ok
B | ā0 | ā1
a(x).[x = 0]ok | ā0 | ā1 ok0
a(x).[x = 1]ok | ā0 | ā1 0
ok
Fig. 1. Execution trees for A | C and B | C
a message, as long as the outcome of the choice is completely invisible to any
other process or observer. However, consider the parallel context C = a0 | a1.
Under any scheduler A has probability at most 1/2 to perform ok . With B,
on the other hand, the scheduler can choose between a0 and a1 based on the
outcome of the probabilistic choice, thus making the maximum probability of ok
equal to 1. The execution trees of A | C and B | C are shown in Figure 1.
In general when +p represents a private choice we would like to have
C[P +p Q] ≈ C[τ.P ] +p C[τ.Q] (1)
for all processes P, Q and all contexts C not containing replication (or recursion).
In the case of replication the above cannot hold since !(P +p Q) makes available
each time the choice between P and Q, while (!τ.P ) +p (!τ.Q) chooses once and
for all which of the two (P or Q) should be replicated. Similarly for recursion.
The reason why we need a τ is explained in Section 5.
The algebraic property (1) expresses in an abstract way the privacy of the
probabilistic choice. Moreover, this property is also useful for the verification of
security properties. The interested reader can find in [14] an example of appli-
cation to a fair exchange protocol. In principle (1) should be useful for any kind
of verification in the process algebra style.
We propose a process-algebraic approach to the problem of hiding the out-
come of random choices. Our framework is based on a calculus obtained by
adding to CCS an internal probabilistic choice construct1. This calculus, to which
we refer as CCSp, is a variant of the one studied in [11], the main differences be-
ing that we use replication instead than recursion, and we lift some restrictions
that were imposed in [11] to obtain a complete axiomatization. The semantics
of CCSp is given in terms of Segala’s simple probabilistic automata [4, 7].
In order to limit the power of the scheduler, we extend CCSp with terms rep-
resenting explicitly the notion of scheduler. The latter interact with the original
processes via a labeling system. This will allow to specify at the syntactic level
(by a suitable labeling) which choices should be visible to schedulers, and which
ones should not.
1 We actually consider a variant of CCS where recursion is replaced by replication. The
two languages are not equivalent, but we believe that the issues regarding the dif-
ferences between replication and recursion are orthogonal to the topics investigated
in this paper.
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1.1 Contribution
The main contributions of this paper are:
– A process calculus CCSσ in which the scheduler is represented as a process,
and whose power can therefore be controlled at the syntactic level.
– An application of CCSσ to an extended anonymity example (the Dining
Cryptographers Protocol, DCP). We also briefly outline how to extend CCSσ
so to allow the definition of private nondeterministic choice, and we apply it
to the DCP with nondeterministic master. To our knowledge this is the first
formal treatment of the scheduling problem in DCP and the first formaliza-
tion of a nondeterministic master for the (probabilistic) DCP.
– The adaptation of the standard notions of probabilistic testing preorders to
CCSσ, and the “sanity check” that they are still precongruences with respect
to all the operators except the nondeterministic sum. For the latter we have
the problem that P and τ.P are must equivalent, but Q + P and Q + τ.P
are not. This is typical for the CCS +: usually it does not preserve weak
equivalences.
– The proof that, under suitable conditions on the labelings of C, τ.P and
τ.Q, CCSσ satisfies the property expressed by (1), where ≈ is probabilistic
testing equivalence.
1.2 Related work
The works that are most closely related to ours are [15–17]. The authors of [15,
16] consider probabilistic automata and introduce a restriction on the scheduler
to the purpose of making them suitable to applications in security protocols.
Their approach is based on dividing the actions of each component of the sys-
tem in equivalence classes (tasks). The order of execution of different tasks is
decided in advance by a so-called task scheduler. The remaining nondetermin-
ism within a task is resolved by a second scheduler, which models the standard
adversarial scheduler of the cryptographic community. This second entity has
limited knowledge about the other components: it sees only the information that
they communicate during execution.
Reference [17] defines a notion of admissible scheduler by introducing an
equivalence relation on the nodes of the execution tree, and requiring that an
admissible scheduler maps two equivalent nodes into bisimilar steps. Both our
paper and [17] have developed, independently, the solution to the problem of the
scheduler in the Dining Cryptographers as an example of application to security.
Another work along these lines is [18], which uses partitions on the state-space
to obtain partial-information schedulers. However [18] considers a synchronous
parallel composition, so the setting is rather different from [15–17] and ours.
Our approach is in a sense dual to the above ones. Instead of defining a
restriction on the class of schedulers, we provide a way to specify that a choice is
transparent to the schedulers. We achieve this by introducing labels in process
terms, used to represent both the nodes of the execution tree and the next action
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or step to be scheduled. We make two nodes indistinguishable to schedulers, and
hence the choice between them private, by associating to them the same label.
Furthermore, in contrast with [15, 16], our “equivalence classes” (schedulable
actions with the same label) can change dynamically, because the same action
can be associated to different labels during the execution. However we don’t know
at the moment whether this difference determines a separation in the expressive
power.
1.3 Plan of the paper
In the next section we briefly recall some basic notions. In Section 3 we define
a preliminary version of the language CCSσ and of the corresponding notion of
scheduler. In Section 4 we compare our notion of scheduler with the more stan-
dard “semantic” notion, and we improve the definition of CCSσ so to retrieve the
full expressive power of the semantic schedulers. In Section 5 we study the prob-
abilistic testing preorders, their compositionality properties, and the conditions
under which (1) holds. Section 6 presents an application to security. Section 7
concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we briefly recall some preliminary notions about the simple prob-
abilistic automata and CCSp.
2.1 Simple probabilistic automata [4, 7]
A discrete probability measure over a set X is a function µ : 2X 7→ [0, 1] such that
µ(X) = 1 and µ(∪iXi) =
∑
i µ(Xi) where Xi is a countable family of pairwise
disjoint subsets of X . The set of all discrete probability measures over X will be
denoted by Disc(X). We will denote by δ(x), x ∈ X (called the Dirac measure
on x) the probability measure that assigns probability 1 to {x}. We will also
denote by
∑
i[pi]µi the probability measure obtained as a convex sum of the
measures µi.
A simple probabilistic automaton2 is a tuple (S, q, A,D) where S is a set of
states, q ∈ S is the initial state, A is a set of actions and D ⊆ S×A×Disc(S) is a
transition relation. Intuitively, if (s, a, µ) ∈ D then there is a transition from the
state s performing the action a and leading to a distribution µ over the states
of the automaton. The idea is that the choice of transition among the available
ones in D is performed nondeterministically, and the choice of the target state
among the ones allowed by µ (i.e. those states q such that µ(q) > 0) is performed
probabilistically.
2 For simplicity in the following we will refer to a simple probabilistic automaton
as probabilistic automaton. Note however that simple probabilistic automata are a
subset of the probabilistic automata defined in [4, 5].
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A probabilistic automaton M is fully probabilistic if from each state of M
there is at most one transition available. An execution α of a probabilistic au-
tomaton is a (possibly infinite) sequence s0a1s1a2s2 . . . of alternating states and
actions, such that q = s0, and for each i (si, ai+1, µi) ∈ D and µi(si+1) > 0
hold. We will use lstate(α) to denote the last state of a finite execution α, and
exec∗(M) and exec(M) to represent the set of all the finite and of all the exe-
cutions of M , respectively.
A scheduler of a probabilistic automaton M = (S, q, A,D) is a function
ζ : exec∗(M) 7→ D
such that ζ(α) = (s, a, µ) ∈ D implies that s = lstate(α). The idea is that a
scheduler selects a transition among the ones available in D and it can base
his decision on the history of the execution. The execution tree of M relative
to the scheduler ζ, denoted by etree(M, ζ), is a fully probabilistic automaton
M ′ = (S′, q′, A′,D′) such that S′ ⊆ exec(M), q′ = q, A′ = A, and (α, a, µ′) ∈ D′
if and only if ζ(α) = (lstate(α), a, µ) for some µ and µ′(αas) = µ(s). Intu-
itively, etree(M, ζ) is produced by unfolding the executions of M and resolving
all deterministic choices using ζ. Note that etree(M, ζ) is a simple3 and fully
probabilistic automaton.
2.2 CCS with internal probabilistic choice
Let a range over a countable set of channel names. The syntax of CCSp is the
following:
α ::= a | ā | τ prefixes
P, Q ::= processes
α.P prefix
| P | Q parallel
| P + Q nondeterministic choice
|
∑
i piPi internal probabilistic choice
| (νa)P restriction
| !P replication
| 0 nil
We will also use the notation P1 +p P2 to represent a binary sum
∑
i piPi with
p1 = p and p2 = 1 − p.
The semantics of a CCSp term is a probabilistic automaton defined induc-
tively on the basis of the syntax according to the rules in Figure 2. We write
s
a
−→ µ when (s, a, µ) is a transition of the probabilistic automaton. We also
denote by µ | Q the measure µ′ such that µ′(P | Q) = µ(P ) for all processes
P and µ′(R) = 0 if R is not of the form P | Q. Similarly (νa)µ = µ′ such that
µ′((νa)P ) = µ(P ).
3 This is true because we do not consider probabilistic schedulers. If we considered
such schedulers then the execution tree would no longer be a simple automaton.
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ACT
α.P
α
−→ δ(P )
RES
P
α
−→ µ α 6= a, a
(νa)P
α
−→ (νa)µ
SUM1
P
α
−→ µ
P + Q
α
−→ µ
PAR1
P
α
−→ µ
P | Q
α
−→ µ | Q
COM
P
a
−→ δ(P ′) Q
a
−→ δ(Q′)
P | Q
τ
−→ δ(P ′ | Q′)
PROB P
i
piPi
τ
−→
P
i
[pi]δ(Pi)
REP1
P
α
−→ µ
!P
α
−→ µ | !P
REP2
P
a
−→ δ(P1) P
a
−→ δ(P2)
!P
τ
−→ δ(P1 | P2 | !P )
Fig. 2. The semantics of CCSp. SUM1 and PAR1 have corresponding right rules SUM2
and PAR2, omitted for simplicity.
A transition of the form P
a
−→ δ(P ′), i.e. a transition having for target a
Dirac measure, corresponds to a transition of a non-probabilistic automaton (a
standard labeled transition system). Thus, all the rules of CCSp imitate the ones
of CCS except from PROB. The latter models the internal probabilistic choice:
a silent τ transition is available from the sum to a measure containing all of its
operands, with the corresponding probabilities.
Note that in the produced probabilistic automaton, all transitions to non-
Dirac measures are silent. This is similar to the alternating model [2], however
our case is more general because the silent and non-silent transitions are not nec-
essarily alternated. On the other hand, with respect to the simple probabilistic
automata the fact that the probabilistic transitions are silent looks as a restric-
tion. However, it has been proved by Bandini and Segala [7] that the simple
probabilistic automata and the alternating model are essentially equivalent, so,
being in the middle, our model is equivalent as well.
3 A variant of CCS with explicit scheduler
In this section we present a variant of CCS in which the scheduler is explicit, in
the sense that it has a specific syntax and its behavior is defined by the oper-
ational semantics of the calculus. We will refer to this calculus as CCSσ. Pro-
cesses in CCSσ contain labels that allow us to refer to a particular sub-process.
A scheduler also behaves like a process, using however a different and much
simpler syntax, and its purpose is to guide the execution of the main process
using the labels that the latter provides. A complete process is a process running
in parallel with a scheduler, and we will formally describe their interaction by
defining an operational semantics for complete processes.
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I ::= 0 I | 1 I | ǫ label indexes
L ::= lI labels
P, Q ::= processes
L:α.P prefix
| P | Q parallel
| P + Q nondeterm. choice
| L:
P
i
piPi internal prob. choice
| (νa)P restriction
| !P replication
| L:0 nil
S, T ::= scheduler
L.S schedule single action
| (L, L).S synchronization
| if L label test
then S
else S
| 0 nil
CP ::= P ‖ S complete process
Fig. 3. The syntax of the core CCSσ
3.1 Syntax
Let a range over a countable set of channel names and l over a countable set of
atomic labels. The syntax of CCSσ, shown in Figure 3, is the same as the one of
CCSp except for the presence of labels. These are used to select the subprocess
which “performs” a transition. Since only the operators with an initial rule can
originate a transition, we only need to assign labels to the prefix and to the
probabilistic sum. For reasons explained later, we also put labels on 0, even
though this is not required for scheduling transitions. We use labels of the form
ls where l is an atomic label and the index s is a finite string of 0 and 1, possibly
empty4. Indexes are used to avoid multiple copies of the same label in case of
replication, which occurs dynamically due to the bang operator. As explained in
the semantics, each time a process is replicated we relabel it using appropriate
indexes.
A scheduler selects a sub-process for execution on the basis of its label, so
we use l.S to represent a scheduler that selects the process with label l and
continues as S. In the case of synchronization we need to select two processes
simultaneously, hence we need a scheduler of the form (l1, l2).S. Using if-then-
else the scheduler can test whether a label is available in the process (in the
top-level) and act accordingly. A complete process is a process put in parallel
with a scheduler, for example l1 :a.l2 : b ‖ l1.l2. Note that for processes with an
infinite execution path we need schedulers of infinite length.
3.2 Semantics
The operational semantics of the CCSσ-calculus is given in terms of probabilistic
automata defined inductively on the basis of the syntax, according to the rules
shown in Figure 4.
ACT is the basic communication rule. In order for l :α.P to perform α, the
scheduler should select this process for execution, so the scheduler needs to be
4 For simplicity we will write l for lǫ.
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ACT
l:α.P ‖ l.S
α
−→ δ(P ‖ S)
RES
P ‖ S
α
−→ µ α 6= a, a
(νa)P ‖ S
α
−→ (νa)µ
SUM1
P ‖ S
α
−→ µ
P + Q ‖ S
α
−→ µ
PAR1
P ‖ S
α
−→ µ
P | Q ‖ S
α
−→ µ | Q
COM
P ‖ l1
a
−→ δ(P ′ ‖ 0) Q ‖ l2
a
−→ δ(Q′ ‖ 0)
P | Q ‖ (l1, l2).S
τ
−→ δ(P ′ | Q′ ‖ S)
REP1
P ‖ S
α
−→ µ
!P ‖ S
α
−→ ρ0(µ) | ρ1(!P )
PROB
l:
P
i piPi ‖ l.S
τ
−→
P
i [pi]δ(Pi ‖ S)
REP2
P ‖ l1
a
−→ δ(P1 ‖ 0) P ‖ l2
a
−→ δ(P2 ‖ 0)
!P ‖ (l1, l2).S
τ
−→ δ(ρ0(P1) | ρ10(P2) | ρ11(!P ) ‖ S)
IF1
l ∈ tl(P ) P ‖ S1
α
−→ µ
P ‖ if l then S1 else S2
α
−→ µ
IF2
l /∈ tl(P ) P ‖ S2
α
−→ µ
P ‖ if l then S1 else S2
α
−→ µ
Fig. 4. The semantics of CCSσ. SUM1 and PAR1 have corresponding right rules SUM2
and PAR2, omitted for simplicity.
of the form l.S. After the execution the complete process will continue as P ‖ S.
The RES rule models restriction on channel a: communication on this channel
is not allowed by the restricted process. Similarly to the Section 2.2, we denote
by (νa)µ the measure µ′ such that µ′((νa)P ‖ S) = µ(P ‖ S) for all processes P
and µ′(R ‖ S) = 0 if R is not of the form (νa)P . SUM1 models nondeterministic
choice. If P ‖ S can perform a transition to µ, which means that S selects one of
the labels of P , then P +Q ‖ S will perform the same transition, i.e. the branch
P of the choice will be selected and Q will be discarded. For example
l1 :a.P + l2 :b.Q ‖ l1.S
a
−→ δ(P ‖ S)
Note that the operands of the sum do not have labels, the labels belong to the
subprocesses of P and Q. In the case of nested choices, the scheduler must go
deep and select the label of a prefix, thus resolving all the choices at once.
PAR1 has a similar behavior for parallel composition. The scheduler selects
P to perform a transition on the basis of the label. The difference is that in
this case Q is not discarded; it remains in the continuation. µ | Q denotes the
measure µ′ such that µ′(P | Q ‖ S) = µ(P ‖ S). COM models synchronization.
If P ‖ l1 can perform the action a and Q ‖ l2 can perform ā, then (l1, l2).S,
scheduling both l1 and l2 at the same time, can synchronize the two. PROB
models internal probabilistic choice. Note that the scheduler cannot affect the
outcome of the choice, it can only schedule the choice as a whole (that’s why a
probabilistic sum has a label) and the process will move to a measure containing
all the operands with corresponding probabilities.
9
REP1 and REP2 model replication. The rules are the same as in CCSp,
with the addition of a re-labeling operator ρk. The reason for this is that we
want to avoid ending up with multiple copies of the same label as the result
of replication, since this would create ambiguities in scheduling as explained in
Section 3.3. ρk(P ) replaces all labels l
s inside P with lsk, and it is defined as
ρk(l
s :α.P ) = lsk :α.ρk(P )
and homomorphically on the other operators (for instance ρk(P | Q) = ρk(P ) |
ρk(Q)). We also denote by ρk(µ) the measure µ
′ such that µ′(ρk(P ) ‖ S) =
µ(P ‖ S). Note that we relabel only the resulting process, not the continuation
of the scheduler: there is no need for relabeling the scheduler since we are free
to choose the continuation as we please.
Finally if-then-else allows the scheduler to adjust its behaviour based on
the labels that are available in P . tl(P ) gives the set of top-level labels of P and
is defined as tl(l :αP ) = tl(l :
∑
piPi) = tl(l :0) = {l} and as the union of the top-
level labels of all sub-processes for the other operators. Then if l then S1 else S2
behaves like S1 if l is available in P and as S2 otherwise. This is needed when
P is the outcome of a probabilistic choice, as discussed in Section 4.
3.3 Deterministic labelings
The idea in CCSσ is that a syntactic scheduler will be able to completely resolve
the nondeterminism of the process, without needing to rely on a semantic sched-
uler at the level of the automaton. This means that the execution of a process
in parallel with a scheduler should be fully probabilistic. To achieve this we will
impose a condition on the labels that we can use in CCSσ processes. A labeling
is an assignment of labels to the prefixes, the probabilistic sums and the nils of a
process. We will require all labelings to be deterministic in the following sense.
Definition 1. A labeling of a process P is deterministic iff for all schedulers S
there is only one transition rule P ‖ S
α
−→ µ that can be applied and the labelings
of all processes P ′ such that µ(P ′) > 0 are also deterministic.
A labeling is linear iff all labels are pairwise distinct. We can show that linear
labelings are preserved by transitions, which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A linear labeling is deterministic.
There are labelings that are deterministic without being linear. In fact, such
labelings will be the means by which we hide information from the scheduler.
However, the property of being deterministic is crucial since it implies that the
scheduler will resolve all the nondeterminism of the process.
Proposition 2. Let P be a CCSσ process with a deterministic labeling. Then
for all schedulers S, the automaton produced by P ‖ S is fully probabilistic.
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4 Expressiveness of the syntactic scheduler
CCSσ with deterministic labelings allows us to separate probabilities from non-
determinism in a straightforward way: a process in parallel with a scheduler
behaves in a fully probabilistic way and the nondeterminism arises from the fact
that we can have many different schedulers. We may now ask the question: how
powerful are the syntactic schedulers wrt the semantic ones, i.e. those defined
directly over the automaton?
Let P be a CCSp process and Pσ be the CCSσ process obtained from P by
applying a linear labeling. We say that the semantic scheduler ζ of P is equivalent
to the syntactic scheduler S of Pσ, written ζ ∼P S, iff the automata etree(P, ζ)
and Pσ ‖ S are probabilistically bisimilar in the sense of [5].
A scheduler S is non-blocking for a process P if it always schedules some
transitions, except when P itself is blocked. Let Sem(P ) be the set of the se-
mantic schedulers for the process P and Syn(Pσ) be the set of the non-blocking
syntactic schedulers for process Pσ. Then we can show that for all semantic
schedulers of P we can create a equivalent syntactic one for Pσ.
Proposition 3. Let P be a CCS process and let Pσ be a CCSσ process obtained
by adding a linear labeling to P . Then ∀ζ ∈ Sem(P ) ∃S ∈ Syn(Pσ) : ζ ∼P S.
To obtain this result the label test of the scheduler is crucial, in the case P
performs a probabilistic choice. The scheduler uses the test to find out the result
of the probabilistic choice and adapt its behaviour accordingly (as the semantic
scheduler is allowed to do). For example let P = l :(l1 :a +p l2 : b) | (l3 :c + l4 :d).
For this process, the scheduler l.(if l1 then l3.11 else l4.l2) first performs the
probabilistic choice. If the result is l1 :a it performs c, a, otherwise it performs
d, b. This is also the reason we need labels for 0, in case it is one of the operands
of the probabilistic choice.
One would expect to obtain also the inverse of Proposition 3, showing the
same expressive power for the two kinds of schedulers. We believe that this is
indeed true, but it is technically more diffucult to state. The reason is that the
simple translation we did from CCSp processes to CCSσ, namely adding a linear
labeling, might introduce choices that are not present in the original process.
For example let P = (a +p a) | (c + d) and Pσ = l :(l1 :a +p l2 : a) | (l3 :c + l4 :d).
In P the choice a +p a is not a real choice, it can only do an τ transition and
go to a with probability 1. But in Pσ we make the two outcomes distinct due
to the labeling. So the syntactic scheduler l.(if l1 then l3.11 else l4.l2) has no
semantic counterpart simply because Pσ has more choices that P , but this is an
artifact of the translation. A more precise translation that would establish the
exact equivalence of schedulers is left as future work.
4.1 Using non-linear labelings
Up to now we are using only linear labelings which, as we saw, give us the whole
power of semantic schedulers. However, we can construct non-linear labelings
that are still deterministic, that is there is still only one transition possible at
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any time even though we have multiple occurrences of the same label. There are
various cases of useful non-linear labelings.
Proposition 4. Let P ,Q be CCSσ processes with deterministic labelings (not
necessarily disjoint). The following labelings are all deterministic:
l :(P +p Q) (2)
l1 :a.P + l2 :b.Q (3)
(νa)(νb)(l1 :a.P + l1 :b.Q | l2 :ā) (4)
Consider the case where P and Q in the above proposition share the same
labels. In (2) the scheduler cannot select an action inside P, Q, it must select
the choice itself. After the choice, only one of P, Q will be available so there
will be no ambiguity in selecting transitions. The case (3) is similar but with
nondeterministic choice. Now the guarding prefixes must have different labels,
since the scheduler should be able to resolve the choice, however after the choice
only one of P, Q will be available. Hence, again, the multiple copies of the labels
do not constitute a problem. In (4) we allow the same label on the guarding
prefixes of a nondeterministic choice. This is because the guarding channels a, b
are restricted and only one of the corresponding output actions is available (ā).
As a consequence, there is no ambiguity in selecting transitions. A scheduler
(l1, l2) can only perform a synchronization on a, even though l1 appears twice.
However, using multiple copies of a label limits the power of the scheduler,
since the labels provide information about the outcome of a probabilistic choice
(and allow the scheduler to choose different strategies through the use of the
scheduler choice). In fact, this is exactly the technique we will use to archive the
goals described in Section 1. Consider for example the process:
l :(l1 :ā.R1 +p l1 :ā.R2) | l2 :a.P | l3 :a.Q (5)
From Proposition 4(2) this labeling is deterministic. However, since both branches
of the probabilistic sum have the same label l1, the scheduler cannot resolve the
choice between P and Q based on the outcome of the choice. There is still non-
determinism: the scheduler l.(l1, l2) will select P and the scheduler l.(l1, l3) will
select Q. However this selection will be independent from the outcome of the
probabilistic choice.
Note that we did not impose any direct restrictions on the schedulers, we
still consider all possible syntactic schedulers for the process (5) above. How-
ever, having the same label twice limits the power of the syntactic schedulers
with respect to the semantic ones. This approach has the advantage that the re-
strictions are limited to the choices with the same label. We already know that
having pairwise distinct labels gives the full power of the semantic scheduler. So
the restriction is local to the place where we, intentionally, put the same labels.
5 Testing relations for CCSσ processes
Testing relations [19] are a method of comparing processes by considering their
interaction with the environment. A test is a process running in parallel with the
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one being tested and which can perform a distinguished action ω that represents
success. Two processes are testing equivalent if they can pass the same tests.
This idea is very useful for the analysis of security protocols, as suggested in [20],
since a test can be seen as an adversary who interferes with a communication
agent and declares ω if an attack is successful. Then two processes are testing
equivalent if they are vulnerable to the same attacks.
In the probabilistic setting we take the approach of [13] which considers the
exact probability of passing a test (in contrast to [10] which considers only the
ability to pass a test with probability non-zero (may-testing) or one (must-
testing)). This approach leads to the definition of two preorders ⊑may and
⊑must. P ⊑may Q means that if P can pass O then Q can also pass O with
the same probability. P ⊑must Q means that if P always passes O with at least
some probability then Q always passes O with at least the same probability.
A labeling of a process is fresh (with respect to a set P of processes) if it is
linear and its labels do not appear in any other process in P . A test O is a CCSσ
process with a fresh labeling, containing the distinguished action ω. Let TestP
denote the set of all tests with respect to P and let (ν)P denote the restriction
on all channels of P , thus allowing only τ actions. We define pω(P, S, O) to
be the probability of the set of executions of the fully probabilistic automaton
(ν)(P | O) ‖ S that contain ω. Note that this set can be produced as a countable
union of disjoint cones so its probability is well-defined.
Definition 2. Let P, Q be CCSσ processes. We define must and may testing
preorders as follows:
P ⊑may Q iff ∀O ∀SP ∃SQ : pω(P, SP , O) ≤ pω(Q, SQ, O)
P ⊑must Q iff ∀O ∀SQ ∃SP : pω(P, SP , O) ≤ pω(Q, SQ, O)
where O ranges over TestP ,Q and SX ranges over Syn((ν)(X | O)).
We also define ≈may,≈must to be the equivalences induced by ⊑may,⊑must
respectively.
A context C is a process with a hole. A preorder ⊑ is a precongruence if
P ⊑ Q implies C[P ] ⊑ C[Q] for all contexts C. May and must testing are
precongruences if we restrict to contexts with fresh labelings and without oc-
currences of +. This result is essentially an adaptation to our framework of the
analogous precongruence property in [3].
Proposition 5. Let P, Q be CCSσ processes such that P ⊑may Q and let C be
a context with a fresh labeling and in which + does not occur. Then C[P ] ⊑may
C[Q]. Similarly for ⊑must.
This also implies that ≈may,≈must are congruences. Note that P, Q in the above
proposition are not required to have linear labelings, P might include multiple
occurrences of the same label thus limiting the power of the schedulers SP . This
shows the locality of the scheduler’s restriction: some choices inside P are hidden
from the scheduler but the rest of the context is fully visible.
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If we remove the freshness condition then Proposition 5 is no longer true. Let
P = l1 :a.l2 : b, Q = l3 :a.l4 : b and C = l : (l1 :a.l2 : c +p [ ]). We have P ≈may Q
but C[P ], C[Q] can be separated by the test O = ā.b̄.ω | ā.c̄.ω (The labeling is
omitted for simplicity since tests always have fresh labelings.) It is easy to see
that C[Q] can pass the test with probability 1 by selecting the correct branch of
O based on the outcome of the probabilistic choice. In C[P ] this is not possible
because of the labels l1, l2 that are common in P, C.
We can now state the result that we announced in Section 1.
Theorem 1. Let P, Q be CCSσ processes and C a context with a fresh labeling
and without occurrences of bang. Then
l :(C[l1 :τ.P ] +p C[l1 :τ.Q]) ≈may C[l :(P +p Q)] and
l :(C[l1 :τ.P ] +p C[l1 :τ.Q]) ≈must C[l :(P +p Q)]
The proof is given in the appendix.
There are two crucial points in the above Theorem. The first is that the
labels of the context are copied, thus the scheduler cannot distinguish between
C[l1 :τ.P ] and C[l1 :τ.Q] based on the labels of the context. The second is that
P, Q are protected by a τ action labeled by the same label l1. This is to ensure
that in the case of a nondeterministic sum (C = R + []) the scheduler cannot
find out whether the second operand of the choice is P or Q unless it commits to
selecting the second operand. For example let R = l1 :(l2 :a+0.50), P = l3 :a, Q =
0. Then R1 = (R+a)+0.1 (R+0) is not testing equivalent to R2 = R+(a+0.1 0)
since they can be separated by O = a.ω and a scheduler that resolves R + a to
a and R + 0 to R. However, if we take R′1 = (R + l :τ.a) +0.1 (R + l :τ.0) then R
′
1
is testing equivalent to R2 since the scheduler will have to resolve both branches
of R′1 in the same way (even though we still have non-determinism).
The problem with replication is simply the persistence of the processes. It is
clear that !P+p!Q cannot be equivalent in any way to !(P +p Q) since the first
replicates only one of P, Q while the second replicates both. However Theorem 1
together with Proposition 5 imply that
C′[l :(C[l1 :τ.P ] +p C[l1 :τ.Q])] ≈may C
′[C[l :(P +p Q)]] (6)
where C is a context without bang and C′ is a context without +. The same is
also true for ≈must. This means that we can lift the sum towards the root of
the context until we reach a bang. Intuitively we cannot move the sum outside
the bang since each replicated copy must perform a different probabilistic choice
with a possibly different outcome.
Theorem 1 shows that the probabilistic choice is indeed private to the process
and invisible to the scheduler. The process can perform it at any time, even in
the very beginning of the execution, without making any difference to an outside
observer.
6 An application to security
In this section we discuss an application of our framework to anonymity. In
particular, we show how to specify the Dining Cryptographers protocol [21] so
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∆
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P
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pi(m̄0〈i == 0〉
| {z }
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| m̄1〈i == 1〉
| {z }
l3
| m̄2〈i == 2〉
| {z }
l4
)
Crypti
∆
= mi(pay)
| {z }
l5,i
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| {z }
l6,i
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| {z }
l7,i
. outi〈pay ⊗ coin1 ⊗ coin2〉
| {z }
l8,i
Coini
∆
= l9,i :((c̄i,i〈0〉
| {z }
l10,i
| c̄i⊖1,i〈0〉
| {z }
l11,i
) +0.5 (c̄i,i〈1〉
| {z }
l10,i
| c̄i⊖1,i〈1〉
| {z }
l11,i
))
Prot
∆
= (νm)(Master | (νc)(
Q
2
i=0 Crypti |
Q
2
i=0 Coini))
Fig. 5. Encoding of the dining cryptographers with probabilistic master
that it is robust to scheduler-based attacks. We first propose a method to encode
secret value passing, which will turn out to be useful for the specification.
6.1 Encoding secret value passing
We propose to encode the passing of a secret message as follows:
l :c(x).P
∆
=
∑
i l :cvi.P [vi/x] (7)
l : c̄〈v〉.P
∆
= l :cv.P (8)
This is the usual encoding of value passing in CSS except that we use the same
label in all the branches of the nondeterministic sum. To ensure that the re-
sulting labeling will be deterministic we should restrict the channels cvi and
make sure that there will be at most one output on c. We will write (νc)P for
(νcv1) . . . (νcvn)P . For example, the labeling of the following process is deter-
ministic:
(νc)(l1 :c(x).P | l :(l2 : c̄〈v1〉 +p l2 : c̄〈v2〉))
This case is a combination of the cases (2) and (4) of Proposition 4. The two
outputs on c are on different branches of the probabilistic sum, so during an
execution at most one of them will be available. Thus there is no ambiguity
in scheduling the sum produced by c(x). The scheduler l.(l1, l2) will perform a
synchronization on cv1 or cv2, whatever is available after the probabilistic choice.
In other words, using the labels we manage to hide the information about which
value was transmitted to P .
6.2 Dining cryptographers with probabilistic master
The problem of the Dining Cryptographers is the following: Three cryptogra-
phers are dining together. At the end of the dinner, the bill has to be paid by
either one of them or by another agent called the master. The master decides
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who will pay and then informs each of them separately whether he has to pay or
not. The cryptographers would like to find out whether the payer is the master
or one of them. However, in the latter case, they also wish to keep the payer
anonymous.
The Dining Cryptographers Protocol (DCP) solves the above problem as
follows: each cryptographer tosses a fair coin which is visible to himself and his
neighbor to the right. Each cryptographer checks the two adjacent coins and, if
he is not paying, announces agree if they are the same and disagree otherwise.
However, the paying cryptographer will say the opposite. It can be proved that
if the number of disagrees is even, then the master is paying; otherwise, one of
the cryptographers is paying [21].
An external observer O is supposed to see only the three announcements
outi〈. . .〉. As discussed in [22], DCP satisfies anonymity if we abstract from their
order. If their order is observable, on the contrary, then a scheduler can reveal the
identity of the payer to O simply by forcing the payer to make his announcement
first. Of course, this is possible only if the scheduler is unrestricted and can choose
its strategy depending on the decision of the master (or on the results of the
coins).
In our framework we can solve the problem by giving a specification of the
DCP in which the choices of the master and of the coins are made invisible to the
scheduler. The specification is shown in Figure 5. We use some meta-syntax for
brevity: The symbols ⊕ and ⊖ represent the addition and subtraction modulo
3, while ⊗ represents the addition modulo 2 (xor). The notation i ==n stands
for 1 if i = n and 0 otherwise.
There are many sources of nondeterminism: the order of communication be-
tween the master and the cryptographers, the order of reception of the coins,
and the order of the announcements. The crucial points of our specification,
which make the nondeterministic choices independent from the probabilistic
ones, are: (a) all communications internal to the protocol (master-cryptographers
and cryptographers-coins) are done by secret value passing, and (b) in each
probabilistic choice the different branches have the same labels. For example, all
branches of the master contain an output on m0, always labeled by l2, but with
different values each time.
Thanks to the above independence, the specification satisfies strong proba-
bilistic anonymity. There are various equivalent definitions of this property, we
follow here the version presented in [22]. Let o represent an observable (the
sequence of announcements), and pS(o | mi〈1〉) represent the conditional proba-
bility, under the scheduler S, that the protocol produces o given that the master
has selected Cryptographer i as the payer.
Proposition 6 (Strong probabilistic anonymity). The protocol in Figure 5
satisfies the following property: for all schedulers S and for all observables o:
pS(o | m0〈1〉) = pS(o | m1〈1〉) = pS(o | m2〈1〉).
Note that different schedulers will produce different traces (we still have nonde-
terminism) but they will not depend on the choice of the master.
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P ::= . . . | l:{P}
CP ::= P ‖ S, T
INDEP
P ‖ T
α
−→ µ
l:{P} ‖ l.S, T
α
−→ µ′
where µ′(P ′ ‖ S, T ′) = µ(P ′ ‖ T ′)
Fig. 6. Adding an “independent” scheduler to the calculus
Some previous treatment of the DCP, including [22], had solved the problem
of the leak of information due to too-powerful schedulers by simply considering as
observable sets of announcements instead than sequences. Thus one could think
that using a true concurrent semantics, for instance event structures, would solve
the problem. We would like to remark that this is false: true concurrency would
weaken the scheduler enough in the case of the DCP, but not in general. For
instance, it would not help in the anonymity example in the introduction.
6.3 Dining cryptographers with nondeterministic master
We sketch here a method to hide also certain nondeterministic choices from the
scheduler, and we show an application to the variant of the Dining Cryptogra-
phers with nondeterministic master.
First we need to extend the calculus with the concept of a second independent
scheduler T that we assume to resolve the nondeterministic choices that we want
to make transparent to the main scheduler S. The new syntax and semantics
are shown in Figure 6. l : {P} represents a process where the scheduling of P is
protected from the main scheduler S. The scheduler S can “ask” T to schedule P
by selecting the label l. Then T resolves the nondeterminism of P as expressed
by the INDEP rule. Note that we need to adjust also the other rules of the
semantics to take T into account, but this change is straightforward. We assume
that T does not collaborate with S so we do not need to worry about the labels
in P .
To model the dining cryptographers with nondeterministic master we replace
the Master process in Figure 5 by the following one.
Master
∆
= l1 :
{∑2
i=0 l12,i :τ.(m0〈i ==0〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
l2
| m1〈i == 1〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
l3
| m2〈i ==2〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
l4
)
}
Essentially we have replaced the probabilistic choice by a protected nondeter-
ministic one. Note that the labels of the operands are different but this is not a
problem since this choice will be scheduled by T . Note also that after the choice
we still have the same labels l2, l3, l4, however the labeling is still deterministic,
similarly to the case 3 of Proposition 4.
In case of a nondeterministic selection of the culprit, and a probabilistic
anonymity protocol, the notion of strong probabilistic anonymity has not been
established yet, although some possible definitions have been discussed in [22].
Our framework makes it possible to give a natural and precise definition.
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Definition 3 (Strong probabilistic anonymity for nondeterministic se-
lection of the culprit). A protocol with nondeterministic selection of the cul-
prit satisfies strong probabilistic anonymity iff for all observables o, schedulers
S, and independent schedulers T1, T2 which select different culprits, we have:
pS,T1(o) = pS,T2(o).
We can prove the above property for our protocol:
Proposition 7. The DCP with nondeterministic selection of the culprit speci-
fied in this section satisfies strong probabilistic anonymity.
7 Conclusion and Future work
We have proposed a process-calculus approach to the problem of limiting the
power of the scheduler so that it does not reveal the outcome of hidden random
choices, and we have shown its applications to the specification of information-
hiding protocols. We have also discussed a feature, namely the distributivity
of certain contexts over random choices, that makes our calculus appealing for
verification. Finally, we have considered the probabilistic testing preorders and
shown that they are precongruences in our calculus.
Our plans for future work are in two directions: (a) we would like to inves-
tigate the possibility of giving a game-theoretic characterization of our notion
of scheduler, and (b) we would like to incorporate our ideas in some existing
probabilistic model checker, for instance PRISM.
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A Proofs
In this appendix we give the proof of the main technical result of our paper.
Theorem 1 Let P, Q be CCSσ processes and C a context with a fresh labeling
and without occurrences of bang. Then
l :(C[l0 :τ.P ] +p C[l0 :τ.Q]) ≈may C[l :(P +p Q)] and
l :(C[l0 :τ.P ] +p C[l0 :τ.Q]) ≈must C[l :(P +p Q)]
Proof.
Since we will always use the label l for all probabilistic sum +p, and l0 for τ.P
and τ.Q, we will omit these labels to make the proof more readable. We will also
denote (1 − p) by p̄.
Let R1 = C[τ.P ] +p C[τ.Q] and R2 = C[P +p Q]. We will prove that for
all tests O and for all schedulers S1 ∈ Syn((ν)(R1 | O)) there exists S2 ∈
Syn((ν)(R2 | O)) such that pω(R1, S1, O) = pω(R2, S2, O) and vice versa. This
implies both R1 ≈may R2 and R1 ≈must R2.
Without loss of generality we assume that tests do not perform internal
actions, but only synchronizations with the tested process. First, it is easy to
see that
pω(P +p Q, l.S, O) = p pω(P, S, O) + p̄ pω(Q, S, O) (9)
pω(l1 :a.P, (l1, l2).S, O) = pω(P, S, O
′) (10)
where (ν)(l1 :a.P | O) ‖ (l1, l2).S
τ
−→ δ((ν)(P | O′ ‖ S)).
In order for the scheduler of R1 to be non-blocking, it has to be of the form
l.S1, since the only possible transition of R1 is the probabilistic choice labeled
by l. By (9) we have
pω(C[τ.P ] + C[τ.Q], l.S1, O) = p pω(C[τ.P ], S1, O) + p̄ pω(C[τ.Q], S1, O)
The proof will be by induction on the structure of C. Let O range over tests
with fresh labelings, let S1 range over non-blocking schedulers for both C[τ.P ]
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and C[τ.Q] (such that l.S1 is a non-blocking scheduler for R1) and let S2 range
over non-blocking schedulers for R2. The induction hypothesis is:
⇒) ∀O ∀S1 ∃S2 :
p pω(C[τ.P ], S1, O) + p̄ pω(C[τ.Q], S1, O) = pω(C[P +p Q], S2, O) and
⇐) ∀O ∀S2 ∃S1 :
p pω(C[τ.P ], S1, O) + p̄ pω(C[τ.Q], S1, O) = pω(C[P +p Q], S2, O)
We have the following cases for C:
– Case C = []. Trivial.
– Case C = l1 :a.C
′
The scheduler S1 of C[τ.P ] and C[τ.Q] has to be of the form S1 = (l1, l2).S
′
1
where l2 is the label of a a prefix in O (if no such prefix exists then the case
is trivial).
A scheduler of the form (l1, l2).S can schedule any process of the form l1 :a.X
(with label l1) giving the transition:
(ν)(l1 :a.X | O) ‖ (l1, l2).S
τ
−→ δ((ν)(X | O′) ‖ S)
and producing always the same O′. The probability pω for these processes
will be given by equation (10).
Thus for (⇒) we have
p pω(l1 :a.C[τ.P ], (l1, l2).S
′
1, O) + p̄ pω(l1 :a.C[τ.Q], (l1, l2).S
′
1, O)
= p pω(C
′[τ.P ], S′1, O
′) + p̄ pω(C
′[τ.Q], S′1, O
′) (10)
= pω(C
′[P +p Q], S
′
2, O
′) Ind. Hyp.
= pω(l1 :a.C
′[P +p Q], (l1, l2).S
′
2, O) (10)
= pω(R2, S2, O)
For (⇐) we can perform the above derivation in the opposite direction, given
that a scheduler for R2 = l1 :a.C
′[P+pQ] must be of the form S2 = (l1, l2).S
′
2.
– Case C = C′ | R
Since we only consider contexts with fresh labelings, R | O is itself a test,
and
pω(X | R, S, O) = pω(X, S, R | O) (11)
Thus for (⇒) we have
p pω(C
′[τ.P ] | R, S1, O) + p̄ pω(C
′[τ.Q] | R, S1, O)
= p pω(C
′[τ.P ], S1, R | O) + p̄ pω(C
′[τ.Q], S1, R | O) (11)
= pω(C
′[P +p Q], S2, R | O) Ind. Hyp.
= pω(C
′[P +p Q] | R, S2, O) (11)
= pω(R2, S2, O)
For (⇐) we can perform the above derivation in the opposite direction.
21
– Case C = l1 :(C
′ +q R)
Since we consider only contexts with fresh labelings, the labels of C′ are
disjoint from those of R, thus the scheduler of a process of the form l1 :
(C′[X ] +q R) must be of the form S = l1.(if lC then SC else SR) where
lC ∈ tl(C
′[X ]), SC is a scheduler containing labels of C
′[X ] and SR is a
scheduler containing labels of R. Moreover
pω(l1 :(C
′[X ] +q R), S, O)
= q pω(C
′[X ], if lC then SC else SR, O) +
q̄ pω(R, if lC then SC else SR, O)
= q pω(C
′[X ], SC , O) + q̄ pω(R, SR, O) (12)
As a consequence, the scheduler S1 of C[τ.P ] and C[τ.Q] has to be of the
form S1 = l1.(if lC then SC else SR). Note that tl(C
′[τ.P ]) = tl(C′[τ.Q])
so the two processes cannot be separated by a test. SC will schedule both
(possibly separating them later).
For (⇒) we have
p pω(l1 :(C
′[τ.P ] +q R), S1, O) + p̄ pω(l1 :(C
′[τ.Q] +q R), S1, O)
= q(p pω(C
′[τ.P ], SC , O) + p̄ pω(C
′[τ.Q], SC , O))+
q̄ pω(R, SR, O) (12)
= q pω(C
′[P +p Q]), S
′
C , O)+
q̄ pω(R, SR, O) Ind. Hyp.
= pω(l1 :(C
′[P +p Q] +q R), l1.(if l
′
C then S
′
C else SR), O) (12)
= pω(R2, S2, O)
Where l′C ∈ tl(C
′[P +p Q]) (and thus l
′
C /∈ tl(R)).
For (⇐) we can perform the above derivation in the opposite direction,
given that a scheduler for R2 = l1 : (C
′[P +p Q] +q R) must be of the form
S2 = l1.(if l
′
C then S
′
C else SR).
– Case C = C′ + R
Consider the process C′[l0 :τ.P ] + R. The scheduler S1 of this process has to
choose between C′[l0 :τ.P ] and R.
There are two cases to have a transition using the SUM1, SUM2 rules.
i) Either S1 = SR and
(ν)(R | O) ‖ SR
α
−→ µ
SUM2
(ν)(C′[l0 :τ.P ] + R | O) ‖ SR
α
−→ µ
In this case
pω(C
′[l0 :τ.P ] + R, SR, O) = pω(R, SR, O) (13)
ii) Or S1 = SC and
(ν)(C′[l0 :τ.P ] | O) ‖ SC
α
−→ µ
SUM1
(ν)(C′[l0 :τ.P ] + R | O) ‖ SC
α
−→ µ
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In this case
pω(C
′[l0 :τ.P ] + R, SC , O) = pω(C
′[l0 :τ.P ], SC , O) (14)
Now consider the process C′[l0 :τ.Q]+R. Since P and Q are behind the l0 :τ
action, we have tl(C′[l0 : τ.Q] = tl(C
′[l0 : τ.P ]). Thus SR and SC will select
R and C′[l0 :τ.Q] respectively and the equations (13) and (14) will hold.
In the case (i) (S = SR) we have:
p pω(C
′[τ.P ] + R, SR, O) + p̄ pω(C
′[τ.Q] + R), SR, O)
= p pω(R, SR, O) + p̄ pω(R, SR, O) (13)
= pω(R, SR, O)
= pω(C
′[P +p Q] + R, SR, O)
= pω(R2, S2, O)
In the case (ii) (S = SC) we have:
p pω(C
′[τ.P ] + R, SC , O) + p̄ pω(C
′[τ.Q] + R), SC , O)
= p pω(C
′[τ.P ], SC , O) + p̄ pω(C
′[τ.Q], SC , O) (14)
= pω(C
′[P +p Q], S
′
C , O) Ind. Hyp.
= pω(C
′[P +p Q] + R, S
′
C , O)
= pω(R2, S2, O)
For (⇐) we can perform the above derivation in the opposite direction.
– Case C = (νa)C′
The process (ν)((νa)C′[X ] | O) has the same transitions as (ν)(C′[X ] | (νa)O).
The result follows by the induction hypothesis.
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